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I. INTRODUCTION
Is an expert who performs litigation services' more like an attorney
or more like a lay witness? The answer to this question should deter-
mine whether experts should be immune from liability for malpractice
committed in rendering litigation services. Until recently, attorneys
were generally the only participants in the litigation process who were
subject to malpractice liability.2 Experts relied on common law or stat-
utory witness immunity for protection from liability for litigation servic-
es malpractice.3 In 1992, two state court decisions in California and
Missouri, Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co.4 (Mattco Forge 1)
and Murphy v. A.A. Mathews,' respectively, limited the scope of wit-
ness immunity specifically to exclude compensated, friendly experts
(party experts) who perform litigation services. This limitation has in-
creased the possibility of multi-million-dollar jury verdicts against party
experts for litigation services malpractice.' This Article attacks the ra-
tionale used by these courts to justify limitation of witness immunity
for party experts.
Attorneys increasingly hire experts to perform litigation services, not
only as testifying expert witnesses, but also as consultants to assist
with pretrial preparation and during trial.7 Attorneys now call upon
1. In this Article, the term "litigation services" shall mean any professional assis-
tance provided by a non-attorney to an attorney in the litigation process, including
both consulting services and testimony. See Providing Litigation Services, CONSULTING
SERVS. PRACTICE AiD 93-4 § 70/110.06 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1993) [hereinafter PRACTICE AID].
2. See infra text accompanying notes 128-43.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 128-43.
4. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (Mattco Forge I) (holding that witness
immunity was not available for compensated, friendly firm of certified public accoun-
tants).
5. 841 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1992) (holding that witness immunity was not available
for compensated friendly engineering expert).
6. See generally Mattco Forge 1, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781; Murphy, 841 S.W.2d 671.
7. See PRACTICE AID, supra note 1, § 70/120.01.
As an expert witness, the CPA presents opinions publicly in an objective
fashion, but as a consultant, the CPA advises and assists the attorney or
client in private [by providing] assistance more like that of an advocate to
help the attorney identify the case's strengths and weaknesses or to develop
a strategy against opposition.
Id. §§ 70/100-7. Trial consulting can cover a variety of services, such as investigation
of claims, document production assistance, calculation of damages, business valuation,
assistance in trial preparation, and jury consulting. See Randall K Hanson et al., Liti-
experts to provide litigation services for run-of-the-mill cases, not solely
for highly technical cases as in the past.8 Some litigators believe that
failure to use an expert in some cases may be legal malpractice.9 Ex-
perts are available in myriad disciplines, and include professionals as
diverse as certified public accountants (CPAs),"° engineers, and
arborists."
To the losers in litigation, experts are tempting deep-pockets to be
pursued as scapegoats to blame for unfavorable outcomes. 2 As the
use of litigation services becomes more prevalent, experts become
more vulnerable to malpractice suits from dissatisfied clients."3 Rather
than promoting adherence to professional standards, this threat of ex-
pert liability seems more likely to result in expert opinions motivated
by the client's interest.
gation Support Liability-The Mattco Decision, CPA J., Mar. 1, 1995, at 28.
8. See Claire P. Rattigan, Making Experts Accountable: How Far Must Attorneys
Go in Investigating Their Experts?, MASS. L WKLY., May 22, 1995, at BI; see also
I1TIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK § 1.1(c), at 1-2 (Roman L. Wel et al. eds., 2d ed.
1995).
9. See Melvin M. Belli, Sr., The Expert Witness: Modifying Roles & Rules to Meet
Today's Needs, TRIAL, July 1982, at 35 ("The cost may be high to employ the expert,
but it may well be higher not to employ one. Indeed, counsel who chooses to pro-
ceed without an expert may be flirting with malpractice."); Robert C. Strodel, The
Expert Witness: The Cornerstone of the Medical Negligence Case, TRIA, June 1982, at
37 ("For an attorney to go to court without an expert waiting in the wings is legal
malpractice.").
10. With a slow-down in traditional accounting and auditing services, increased
competition, and fee pressure from clients, many CPAs are now turning to litigation
services to diversify and expand services, and to increase profits and growth. See
Scott Peltz & R. Michael Yesh, The CPA as Expert Witness-Does Liability Loom?,
AM. BANKR. J., Mar. 1995, at 15. More and more CPAs are preparing damages analy-
ses, performing business valuations, assisting counsel in document productions, partic-
ipating in settlement negotiations, and providing expert witness testimony. See Michael
A. Cain et al., Liability: Expert Witnesses-In Jeopardy?, J. OF AcCT., Dec. 1994, at
42.
11. See Belli, supra note 9, at 35 ("In this modern age an 'expert' is found in any
field, no matter how esoteric.").
12. See Douglas Pahl, Note, Absolute Immunity for the Negligent Expert Witness:
Bruce v. Byme-Stevens, 26 WILAME'rE L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1990) ("With their deep
pockets and ample malpractice insurance policies, professionals have become an in-
creasingly inviting target for injured plaintiffs." (footnote omitted)).
13. For purposes of this Article, the "client" of the expert is the actual party to
the litigation, regardless of whether the expert is retained directly by that party or by
that party's attorney. See PRACTICE Am, supra note 1, § 70-100-8. Usually, the expert
is retained directly by the attorney, rather than by the actual party to the litigation.
See id. Under such arrangement, the expert's work product may be protected by the
attorney work product doctrine, which shields an attorney's work product from dis-
covery by the opposing party. See id.
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A major problem resulting from the lack of immunity for party ex-
perts is the uncertainty involved in proving that expert malpractice,
rather than some other factor in the litigation process, was the cause of
the client's unfavorable outcome in the underlying lawsuit. Recent com-
mentators have jumped on the expert-bashing bandwagon and argue
that an expert should be liable when the expert receives compensation
and fails to act as a reasonably prudent professional in rendering litiga-
tion services. 4 None of these commentators, however, has seriously
considered the problems of proving causation and damages in litigation
malpractice cases. In early 1997, the California Court of Appeal in
Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (Mattco Forge I), 5 reviewing the
jury verdict, held that a trial court should apply the controversial "suit
within a suit" (SWAS) doctrine,"8 and should instruct the jury on the
"substantial factor" rule of causation in fact, to prove causation and
damages in malpractice lawsuits against party experts who provide
litigation services. 7 The Mattco Forge II decision was based on the
assumption that, for purposes of applying the SWAS doctrine, an
expert's act of consulting on a case is analogous to an attorney's act of
trying a case or an insurer's act of defending a case." Courts apply the
SWAS doctrine primarily in attorney litigation malpractice lawsuits and
in lawsuits against insurers for negligence in defending a lawsuit."9
14. See Randall K Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming "Hired
Guns", 31 WAKE FOREST L REV. 497, 511 (1996) (arguing that increased witness liabil-
ity may result in fewer extreme positions taken by experts); Douglas R. Richmond,
The Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 CAP. U. L REv. 693, 710
(1993) ("This emerging malpractice theory is warranted and reasonable, especially
given experts' contractual and special relationships with their clients, and the absence
of other controls or remedies."); Eric G. Jensen, Comment, When "Hired Guns" Back-
fire: The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L.
REV. 185, 206 (1993) ("The decisions holding experts liable are correct when mea-
sured against the recognized goals of tort law."); Pahl, supra note 12, at 1078-80
(arguing that as an alternative to immunity, the client should be allowed to use the
.suit within a suit" (SWAS) approach in an action against an expert for negligent
preparation).
15. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (Mattco Forge Hf).
16. See id. at 787 (noting that "trial within a trial" and "case within a case," are
alternative means of referring to the SWAS doctrine).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50 (discussing the SWAS doctrine as a
method to determine causation and damages in an attorney malpractice suit).
18. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
19. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 32.8, at
168-70 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the trial within a trial approach) [hereinafter MALLEN
& SMrm]; cf Coleman v. Gurwin, 503 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Mich. 1993), which stated.
Commentators have discussed the appropriateness of the use of the
SWAS doctrine in attorney litigation malpractice cases for almost forty
years, and many commentators still question the validity of outcomes in
cases in which it is used.2"
This Article first compares the handling of causation in the non-attor-
ney professional malpractice paradigm (applied in cases involving ser-
vices other than litigation services) with the handling of causation in
the attorney malpractice paradigm.2" Then, the Article reviews the
Mattco Forge cases to provide a background for discussion of the two
major issues addressed in that litigation-the availability of witness
immunity for experts who perform litigation services and the applica-
tion of the SWAS doctrine in litigation services malpractice lawsuits.'
The Article proceeds to show the impropriety of applying the attorney
malpractice paradigm to litigation services malpractice lawsuits.2 Fi-
nally, the Article critically analyzes the rationale used to justify denial
of witness immunity to experts and concludes that the rationale for
protecting witnesses from lawsuits, the differences between experts and
attorneys, the existence of other incentives for experts to adhere to
professional standards, and the lack of a sufficient method of proving
causation and damages together justify applying witness immunity to
party experts.24
[SWAS has] "vitality only in a limited number of situations, such as where an
attorney's negligence prevents the client from bringing a cause of action, ....
where the attorney's failure to appear causes judgment to be entered against
his client or where the attorney's negligence prevents an appeal from being
perfected."
Id. (quoting Basic Foods Indus., Inc. v. Grant, 310 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Mich. CtL App.
1981)); Gautam v. DeLuca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("'[I]t
should be within the discretion of the trial judge as to the manner in which the
plaintiff may proceed .... '") (quoting Lieberman v. Employers Ins., 419 A.2d 417,
427 (N.J. 1980)).
20. See Richard G. Coggin, Attorney Negligence . . .A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W.
VA. L. REV. 225, 234 (1958) ("[Mlany objections have been raised to the 'suit within a
suit' method of determining damages."); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The
Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VA.D. L REV. 1657, 1691 (1994) ("A 'bad' underly-
ing case becomes a winner, insignificant damages suddenly grow to two, three, or
four times the true value of the underlying case."); Noreen L Slank, Suit Within a
Suit: A Doctrine Michigan Courts Hate to Love, 72 MIcH. BAR J. 1174, 1177 (1993)
("Suit with a suit principles must continue to be refined.").
21. See infra notes 25-50 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 89-127 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 128-91 and accompanying text.
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II. CAUSATION AND DAMAGES IN MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
A. The General Professional Malpractice Paradigm
As with any common law negligence action, the mere breach of a
duty by a professional does not create an action for malpractice.25 In a
malpractice case, the plaintiff must also prove that the breach of the
professional duty caused harm to the plaintiff.2" This satisfies the es-
sential tort element of causation.' The plaintiff may then recover the
damages caused by the malpractice.' The plaintiff cannot recover
damages in such actions when no actual harm has occurred, when the
harm is nominal or speculative, or when harm has been threatened but
not yet realized.'
Causation is also known as "proximate cause" or "legal cause," a
component of which is "cause in fact" or "actual cause. "' The two
25. A claim against an attorney for litigation malpractice, or against a CPA for
malpractice for audit and tax services, is most frequently in the form of common law
negligence. See DANIEL L GOLDWASSER & M. THOMAS ARNOLD, AccouNTANT's LIABILITY
§ 1.4[A], at 1-22 to 1-23 (1996) [hereinafter GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD]; 1 MALLEN &
SmTrrH, supra note 19, § 8.12, at 601 (discussing negligence). The elements of a cause
of action for professional negligence of both lawyers and accountants are the same
as any ordinary negligence action and include the following: (1) existence of a duty
of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of
the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation;
and (4) actual harm or damages. See Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (Cal. 1971)
(discussing negligence); GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra, § 4.2, at 4-3 to 4-4; 1 MALLEN
& SMITH, supra note 19, § 8.12, at 602-08; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984),'[hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON]; Travis Morgan Dodd, Note, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negli-
gence: Justifying Disparate Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80
GEO. I.J. 909, 912 (1992) (discussing negligence as applied to accountants).
26. See Budd, 491 P.2d at 436 (discussing professional negligence).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 30, at 164-65.
30. According to Prosser and Keeton:
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth
more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of'con-
fusion [as in the determination of proximate cause]. Nor, despite the manifold
attempts ... to clarify the subject is there yet any general agreement as to
the best approach.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 41, at 263. However, it is clear that proximate
cause includes "cause in fact," which "embraces all things which have so far contrib-
uted to the result that without them it would not have occurred." See id. at 264-65;
widely-recognized tests for establishing cause in fact are the "but for"
test and the "substantial factor" test.
3 1
Under the but for test "[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the
event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct."'
"[Clonversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the
event would have occurred without it."33 This test, however, is not ap-
propriate if more than one cause brings about an event, and any one of
the causes, "operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the
identical result."'
If more than one cause brings about an event, the courts apply the
substantial factor test.' If the negligence of the defendant is not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the harm to the plaintiff, the defendant
is not liable.' This test is applicable where (1) a similar, but not nec-
essarily identical, result would have occurred without the defendant's
act, or (2) one defendant's act was only an insignificant contribution to
the result.3 7
In the typical case involving a non-attorney professional who is not
rendering litigation services, expert testimony may provide evidence of
causation when the fact of causation is not commonly known.' The
plaintiff does not have to prove with certainty that the malpractice
caused harm to the plaintiff, but she must prove that it is more proba-
ble than not that the defendant's conduct was a cause of the harm.'
see also Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1991) ("One of the concepts
included in the term proximate cause is cause in fact, also referred to as actual
cause.").
31. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 41, at 265-68; Mitchell, 819 P.2d at
876 (discussing the but for and substantial factor tests).
32. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 41, at 266.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 876 (citing Thomsen v. Rexall Drug & Chem.
Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining limitations on the but
for test)).
35. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 41, at 267.
36. See id.; MitcheU, 819 P.2d at 876 (citing Vecchione v. Carlin, 168 Cal. Rptr.
571, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the substantial factor test applies where
"concurrent, independent causes" exist)). A number of negligence suits against CPAs
for audit or tax services have been successfully defended on lack of causation
grounds, because the plaintiff did not show that the alleged negligence of the CPA
substantially contributed to the plaintiffs harm. See GOLDWASSER & ARNOLI), supra
note 25; § 4.2[D][1], at 4-42. Instead, the losses resulted from the acts of other par-
ties, from specific business decisions made by the client, or from the unusual method
in which the client operated its business, among others. See id.
37. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 41, at 267-68.
38. See generally id. § 41, at 269 (stating that expert testimony may be used to
establish causation).
39. See id. A mere possibility of causation is not enough; but the plaintiff is not
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When the matter is one of speculation or conecture, or the probabili-
ties are at least equally balanced, the court must direct a verdict for the
defendant.' The liability of a defendant for a single, indivisible injury
is joint and several, so the defendant may be responsible for the entire
loss although the defendant's fault may be relatively small compared to
the other tortfeasors.4" However, the defendant may have a claim for
contribution or comparative indemnity against other tortfeasors.42
B. The Attorney Litigation Malpractice Paradigm
Attorney malpractice cases involving attorney representation in con-
nection with litigation use a different method of determining causation
and damages. Courts consider expert testimony too speculative to
prove causation or damages in an attorney litigation malpractice suit.'
required to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt See id.; see also 4 MALLEN &
SMrrH, supra note 19, § 32.10, at 181.
40. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, § 41, at 269.
41. See GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, 25, § 4.4, at 4-80; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 875 (1979).
42. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 903-07 (Cal.
1978) (creating the doctrine of comparative indemnity among joint tortfeasors in Cali-
fornia); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979); GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, SU-
pra note 25, § 4.5, at 4-82 to 4-83; UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT
§ 1 (1955).
This Article does not consider the plight of an expert who has committed an
intentional tort. Such tortfeasors are neither entitled to indemnity from negligent
tortfeasors nor permitted to use the defense of comparative negligence against the
plaintiff. See Allen v. Sundean, 186 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Godfrey v.
Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
43. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 805 (Cal. Ct App. 1986),
overruled on other grounds by Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997) ("We
are aware of no California cases which hold that in an attorney malpractice action,
expert testimony alone would suffice to prove the outcome of the underlying case.");
Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (stating that a simple valua-
tion approach "advances speculative values as a measure of recovery."); 4 MALLEN &
SMIrH, supra note 19, § 32.17, at 222 (noting that courts have refused or been reluc-
tant to admit expert testimony about what the result of the underlying proceeding
would have been); see also Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr.
2d 781, 794 (Cal. Ct App. 1997) (Mattco Forge II) ("[T]o enable a plaintiff merely to
value a case, renders professionals liable as guarantors, as almost all cases have
some value." (citation omitted)); cf. Gautam v. DeLuca, 521 A.2d 1342, 1348 (N.J. Su-
per Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("[The New Jersey] Supreme Court has eschewed rigid appli-
cation of the [SWASI principle in favor of a more flexible rule . . . [saying that] 'it
should be within the discretion of the trial judge as to the manner in which the
plaintiff may proceed to prove his claim for damages ... " (quoting Lieberman v.
Instead, the courts apply the SWAS doctrine." Under this doctrine, the
client has a second chance to try the underlying lawsuit during which
the alleged malpractice occurred.'
Courts and commentators generally agree that the greatest obstacle a
plaintiff must overcome in a legal malpractice action is the SWAS re-
quirement.' The client must win two suits to recover in one. To win
the malpractice suit against an attorney, the client must win a re-cre-
ation of the underlying action (the SWAS) and, thus, must prove that a
more favorable outcome was possible in the underlying suit. If the cli-
ent achieves a more favorable outcome in the SWAS, the client has
proven that the professional's negligence caused harm to the client. The
SWAS is also used to prove the amount of damages resulting from such
harm. If the client does not win the SWAS, the professional is not lia-
ble; if the client wins the SWAS, the professional is liable for, among
other things, the economic difference between the outcome of the origi-
nal suit and the outcome of the SWAS.47
The approach of the SWAS doctrine is equivalent to the but for test.
Courts generally accept the but for approach to attorney litigation mal-
practice.4" An attorney is responsible for the entire harm if the
Employers Ins., 419 A.2d 417, 427 (N.J. 1980)); Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1170
(Ohio 1997) (rejecting a rule requiring a plaintiff "to prove, in every instance, that he
or she would have been successful in the underlying matter. Such a requirement
would be unjust, maling any recovery virtually impossible for those who truly have a
meritorious legal malpractice claim."); John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malprac-
tice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and the Threatening Rlood, 61 TEMP. L
REv. 1127, 1149 (1988) ("Use of settlement value to establish the measure of damages
for litigation malpractice is an option that courts should make available . . ").
44. The SWAS doctrine is based on early English and American cases in which the
real issue was damages. See Kenneth G. Lupo, Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal
Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. LJ. 689, 694-95 (1977). Most of the early American cases
are either unrelated to legal malpractice or are solely limited to legal malpractice
cases in which the alleged negligence involved breach of the attorney's duty to col-
lect on a debt. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 693 ("It is virtually undisputed that the burden of proving two ac-
tions in a single proceeding is extremely heavy."); Neil T. Shayne & Norman H.
Dachs, Legal Malpractice-The Rising Cost of the Error of Our Ways, 25 DEF. LJ.
425, 435 (1976) (stating that the SWAS is "the greatest hurdle the client must over-
come"); Erik M. Jensen, Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Mal-
practice Cases, 63 CORNELL L REv. 666, 671 (1978) (-The cost and complexity of
such a proceeding may well discourage the few plaintiffs otherwise willing to pursue
the slim chance of success.").
47. However, if the client was the plaintiff in the underlying suit, recovery is limit-
ed to the extent the attorney can prove the judgment in the SWAS would have been
uncollectible from the original defendant. See MALLEN & Sm1TH, supra note 19,
§ 29.13, at 672-75.
48. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 301:103 (1997)
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plaintiff-client proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the client
can obtain a more favorable result in the SWAS, and, thus, should have
obtained a more favorable result in the underlying suit but for the mal-
practice of the attorney.49
The SWAS is an objective test designed to determine what "should
have been," rather than what "would have been."' Therefore, factors
such as the personality or inclinations of the judge or jury in the origi-
nal suit are irrelevant. However, the judge, the jury, the attorneys, the
opposing party, the venue, the available evidence, and other factors
may be different in the SWAS. The applicable law and the party alleged-
ly aggrieved by the malpractice may be the only common factors be-
tween the original suit and the SWAS.
Il. THE MATTCO FORGE CASES
A. The Underlying Case
The Mattco Forge cases resulted from the dismissal with prejudice of
a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California in 1989."' Mattco Forge, Inc. (Mattco), a parts manufacturer
owned by a native Argentinian who is a naturalized United States citi-
zen, filed a federal civil rights action in 1985 against General Electric
(GE) after GE removed Mattco from GE's list of approved subcon-
tractors.52 Mattco alleged that GE's removal was racially motivated.'
("Proof of a 'proximate cause' relationship ... requires a showing that 'but for' the
attorney's misconduct the injury would not have been suffered.") [hereinafter
LAWYERs' MANUAL]; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETIncs § 5.6.3, at 218 ("In
general, the plaintiff must show that but for the lawyer's negligence, the representa-
tion would have resulted in a materially different, and more advantageous, out-
come."); cf. Jensen, supra note 46, at 672 ("Because of its harshness the "but for"
test has not served the judicial system well in legal malpractice cases.").
49. See Arciniega v. Bank of San Bernardino, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495 (Cal. Ct App.
1997) (justifying the application of the SWAS doctrine to determine damages where
an attorney failed to pursue a claim). The California Court of Appeal stated, "It is
axiomatic that the damages for such failure are those which would have been recov-
ered but for the failure to exercise care." Id. at 506.
50. See 4 MALLEN & SmrrH, supra note 19, § 32.8, at 169-70; Mattco Forge, Inc. v.
Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 792-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (Mattco Forge
I) ("'[Tihe jury's task is to determine what a reasonable judge or fact finder would
have done.'") (quoting Brust v. Newton, 852 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Wash. CL App. 1993)).
"Could have been" and "might have been" are not the standard because they are
speculative. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 32.8, at 170.
51. See generally Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
52. See id. at 783.
In a motion for dismissal, GE argued that Mattco had fabricated the
documents it produced in discovery, with the assistance of Arthur
Young & Company (Arthur Young),' 4 an accounting firm that Mattco
had retained as its litigation consultant and expert witness in the
case.'M Mattco hired Arthur Young to assist in Mattco's calculation of
lost profits due to GE's removal of Mattco from its list of subcontrac-
tors.'M Prior to Mattco retaining Arthur Young, a partner from Arthur
Young met with the owner of Mattco and gave him ,a "glossy promotion-
al brochure" which represented that Arthur Young's litigation services
professionals were specially trained in legal procedures. 7 However, a
different Arthur Young CPA, who subsequently performed the work for
Mattco on behalf of Arthur Young, had no training or experience in
litigation services.'
When the CPA assigned to the job discovered as missing almost half
of the worksheets used by Mattco to prepare bids to GE, he asked
Mattco's owner to prepare new worksheets to reflect how the owner
would have estimated the costs associated with the bids.' These new-
ly-created worksheets were intermingled with original business docu-
ments and were not identified as not being original business records.'
The newly-created worksheets were included in documents produced
by Mattco's attorneys during discovery in response to a document re-
quest by GE." No one from Mattco or Arthur Young told GE about the
newly-created worksheets. 2
After reviewing the documents produced in discovery, GE filed a
counterclaim against Mattco, alleging that Mattco and its owner had
committed procurement fraud by bid rigging.' During discovery, GE
53. See id.
54. Arthur Young was one of the group of the largest international accounting
firms then known as the "Big Eight" See Jeffrey R Laderman, When One Plus One
Equals No. 1, Bus. WL, June 5, 1989, at 92. Arthur Young subsequently merged with
Ernst & Whinney (another "Big Eight" firm) to become what is now Ernst & Young,
LLP, one of the group of the largest international accounting firms now called the
"Big Six." See id. Ernst & Young has entered into another agreement to merge with
yet another Big Six firm that would be effective in early 1998. See Tracey L. Miller,
For Ernst/KPMG: Business as Usual, But on a Global Scale, AccT. TODAY, Nov. 10-
23, 1997, at 1.
55. See Mattco Forge I, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783.
56. See id. at 784.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 784-85.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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uncovered information which it believed proved that Mattco had de-
stroyed other documents, that Mattco had hidden witnesses, and that
one of Mattco's officers had committed perjury during discovery.'
Meanwhile, the Arthur Young partner testified in a deposition that,
when he calculated the damages, he had not relied on the newly-creat-
ed worksheets.'
GE filed a motion to dismiss based on the alleged misconduct of
Mattco and Arthur Young. ' In considering GE's motion, the district
court found that Mattco and its owner fraudulently created and know-
ingly produced the newly-created worksheets, and that the Arthur
Young partner had relied on the fabricated worksheets in calculating
damages.67 The district court ruled that (1) evidence of damages previ-
ously produced or prepared for the action would be inadmissible; (2)
Arthur Young would be precluded from assisting with the production of
evidence concerning damages; (3) no materials previously used by Ar-
thur Young to calculate damages could be used to produce any evi-
dence on damages; and (4) GE would be reimbursed for attorneys' fees,
costs, and expenses relating to production of evidence concerning dam-
ages.' 8 The district court subsequently ordered that Mattco's failure to
pay $1.4 million in sanctions to GE within forty-five days would result
in dismissal. The district court also stated that it would consider an
additional penalty for destruction of evidence against Mattco and its
owner once the sanctions had been paid.'M Notwithstanding the court's
order, Mattco paid no sanctions because the parties settled and dis-
missed their respective actions.7"
B. The Litigation Services Malpractice Trial
Six months later, Mattco sued Arthur Young in Los Angeles Superior
Court, stating the following causes of action: professional negligence,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment.7 Arthur
Young fied a cross-complaint against Mattco's former attorneys alleging
fraud and claiming complete and partial indemnity.' In support of its
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 784-86.
68. See id. at 785-86.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 783.
72. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 584-85 (Cal.
cross-complaint, Arthur Young introduced the expert declaration of an
attorney who opined as follows:
[Mattco's former attorneys] failed to comply with the professional standards of an
attorney at law by, inter alia, failing to recognize and respect the distinction be-
tween Young's role as a consultant and as a testifying expert..., failing to direct
and supervise Young's work... , [and] improperly representing to the court the
nature of the work undertaken by Young and the testimony Young would provide
on the issue of damages.n
Before trial, Arthur Young obtained a summary judgment based on
Mattco's unclean hands and a statutory absolute litigation privilege for
publications or broadcasts made in judicial proceedings.' However, in
Mattco Forge I, the court of appeal unanimously reversed, holding in part
that the litigation privilege did not apply.7"
Subsequently, the trial against Arthur Young proceeded, lasting more
than four months and involving approximately forty witnesses, 880
marked exhibits, 10,000 combined pages of clerk's and reporter's tran-
scripts, and almost 200 pages of appellate briefs for motions filed during
trial.7' In 1994, the jury awarded Mattco $41.9 million.77
Ct. App. 1995). Arthur Young voluntarily dismissed its cross-complaint without preju-
dice, but subsequently refiled it. See id. at 585. Prior to adjudication, Mattco and its
former attorneys entered into a sliding-scale settlement agreement, by virtue of which
the former attorneys promised to pay $150,000 to Mattco up front and up to an addi-
tional $600,000, thereby guaranteeing Mattco "a recovery of at least $750,000 on its
claims against Young." See id. If, however, Mattco recovered more than $750,000 from
Young, or if Mattco settled or entered into a stipulated judgment with Young, the
former attorneys would pay nothing to Mattco. See id. The trial court found that the
settlement was made in good faith and granted the former attorneys' motion to dis-
miss Young's cross-complaint. See id. at 586. The appellate court reversed. See id. at
593.
73. See id. at 585-86.
74. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 783 (Cal.
Ct App. 1997) (Mattco Forge I). The litigation privilege is codified in California Civil
Code section 47(b), which states in relevant part-
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: ... (b) In any (1) legisla-
tive proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding
authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding
authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with
Section 1084) of Title I of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure ....
CAL CIV. CODE § 47(b) (West Supp. 1997). "[T]he privilege applies to any communica-
tion (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other par-
ticipants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
have some connection or logical relation to the action." Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d
365, 369 (Cal. 1990) (citations omitted).
75. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (Mattco Forge I1).
76. See id. at 784.
77. See id. The jury award included $13.2 million in compensatory damages,
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The trial court did not apply the SWAS doctrine.' The trial court
failed to instruct the jury on the causation element which required a
connection between Arthur Young's negligence and the harm to
Mattco.' The only evidentiary burden placed on Mattco with respect to
liability "was to show Arthur Young had caused Mattco to suffer
'harm.'"' In the damages phase, the trial court required only that Mattco
prove "the extent of the harm," primarily the "'value'" of Mattco's case
against GE.8 The trial court instructed the jury that in determining that
value, "'you shall exercise reasonable judgment and the damages you
shall fix shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence.'"'
C. Consideration of the SWAS Doctrine on Appeal
In Mattco Forge H, Arthur Young, appealing the multimillion-dollar
award, contended that (1) the trial court should have required Mattco to
prove that it would have prevailed in the underlying federal case against
GE, and (2) the trial court should have applied the SWAS doctrine to
determine the impact of Arthur Young's negligence on the outcome of
the underlying federal case.' In response, Mattco argued that the SWAS
doctrine was limited to attorney malpractice cases and that a "valuation
method" employing expert witness testimony as to the outcome of the
underlying case was appropriate for the malpractice action against Ar-
thur Young.' The court of appeal unanimously agreed with Arthur
Young and held that Mattco's burden of proof required a SWAS to prove
damages.'
The Mattco Forge II opinion specifically addressed the causation issue
by reviewing the jury instructions given below.' The court of appeal
concluded that proper instruction of the jury would require Mattco to
establish that Arthur Young's negligence was a substantial factor in
$995,717.38 in out-of-pocket expenses and interest, and $27.68 million in punitive dam-
ages. See id. at 783 n.1.
78. See id. at 793-94.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 786 (footnote omitted).
81. See id. at 786.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 799.
86. See id. at 783-99.
Mattco's loss of the prior lawsuit. 7 The opinion stated that, although
Arthur Young was found negligent, "Arthur Young cannot be held liable
for Mattco's own defalcations which may have contributed to the loss of
its legal claim against GE."'
IV. MISAPPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY LITIGATION MALPRACTICE PARADIGM
TO LITIGATION SERVICES MALPRACTICE
A. Use of the SWAS Doctrine is Improper for Proving Causation
If witness immunity is not available for party experts, a trial court
should not use a SWAS by itself to prove causation in a litigation servic-
es malpractice lawsuit. Use of the SWAS doctrine to prove causation in
such cases is improper, because the SWAS doctrine is a variant of the
but for test and should not be used to prove causation when factors
other than the expert's negligence may have affected the outcome of the
underlying suit. If other factors may have significantly affected the out-
come of the underlying suit, a court should apply the substantial factor
test. If a court could apply the substantial factor test in a litigation ser-
vices malpractice case, the expert would have no liability if the expert's
negligence is insignificant. Even if the client won the SWAS, the expert
would not be liable had a similar outcome in the underlying suit resulted
without the expert's negligence, or if the expert's negligence contributed
relatively insignificantly to the outcome of the underlying suit.
California law requires that courts apply the substantial factor test in
all negligence cases.' Accordingly, in Mattco Forge II, the court of ap-
peal jerrybuilt an approach to handle litigation services malpractice not
only by applying the SWAS doctrine, but also -by mandating a jury in-
struction covering the substantial factor test.' The court of appeal rec-
ognized the need for the jury to consider other persons who could have
influenced the outcome of the underlying suit. 1 The opinion declared
87. See id. at 795.
88. See id. at 793.
89. See Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878-79 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting the but for
test of causation in negligence and requiring the application of the substantial factor
test); Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1072 (N.J. 1996) (applying the
substantial factor test to an attorney transactional malpractice lawsuit).
90. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783-99.
91. The court of appeal concluded as follows:
The conduct of Arthur Young in the calculation of Mattco's lost profits was
shown to be negligent. But the triers of fact also must find that Arthur
Young's negligence caused the loss of Mattco's claim against GE in order to
reach a verdict in favor of Mattco. Arthur Young cannot be held liable for
Mattco's own defalcations which may have contributed to the loss of its legal
claim against GE .... The lack of a proper causation instruction permitted
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that even if the trial court had applied the SWAS doctrine, the trial
court's failure to instruct the jury on the substantial factor test "left the
jurors in a sea of speculation and conjecture." 2 The court stated that
the applicable standard in a professional malpractice suit is the SWAS,
"accompanied by proper instructions."93 As an example, the opinion sug-
gested instructions that require the plaintiff to establish that "the
professional's negligence was a substantial factor in the plaintiff's loss of
the prior lawsuit."'
Some jurisdictions, such as New York, which have not yet addressed
expert witness liability, articulate the element of causation in attorney
litigation malpractice actions primarily in terms of the but for test.95 If
such jurisdictions apply the SWAS doctrine as the only means to prove
causation in a litigation services malpractice suit, the result will be the
Mattco to escape its burden of proving Arthur Young's negligence caused
Mattco to lose its lawsuit against GE .... Such an instruction also would
have put in issue Mattco's misconduct in the underlying lawsuit against GE.
Id. at 793-94.
92. See id. at 793.
93. See id. at 794.
94. See id. at 795.
95. See, e.g., Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 513 N.W.2d 773, 775-76 (Mich.
1994) ("[A] plaintiff 'must show that but for the attorney's malpractice, he would
have been successful in the underlying suit'") (quoting Coleman v. Gurman, 503
N.W.2d 435, 437 (Mich. 1993)); Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987)
("New York has traditionally applied a 'but for' approach to causation when evaluat-
ing legal malpractice claims.") (citations omitted); 76 N.Y. JUR. 2D § 39 (1996) ("But
so long as counsel's negligence was one of the proximate or efficient causes of the
injury, causation is established, even though mistakes made by others may have also
contributed."); Wolfram, supra note 48, § 5.6.3, at 218; LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note
48, § 310:103 (proof of proximate cause "requires a showing that 'but for' the
attorney's misconduct the injury would not have been suffered").
In applying the but for test, courts have also stated that the attorney's negli-
gence must be a substantial factor in the unfavorable outcome of the underlying suit
An attorney can be held liable to a client for malpractice only if the
attorney's breach of duty is a substantial cause of the injury suffered by the
aggrieved client[;] [t]his has been said to require the client to prove that 'but
for' the improper act or omission by the attorney, the client would not have
been harmed in the manner alleged.
L.wYERS' MANUAL, supra note 48, § 301:132; see Wolfram, supra note 48, § 5.6.3, at
218 ("There is no requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that the malpractice was
the only cause, so long as there is competent proof that it was a cause that contrib-
uted significantly to the plaintiffs loss.").
misapplication of the but for test in situations in which the expert may
be an insignificant factor in the outcome of the SWAS.
If a court applies the SWAS doctrine in a litigation services malpractice
suit without considering the influence of other persons (such as the at-
torney or other experts) who may be substantial factors in the outcome
of the underlying suit, the trier of fact will not have the opportunity to
determine whether a similar result would have followed without the
expert's act, or whether the expert's contribution to the result was in-
significant. For instance, as noted above, Arthur Young alleged in one of
the Mattco Forge appeals that, among other things, Mattco's original
attorneys failed to comply with attorney professional standards, failed to
recognize and respect the distinction between the accounting firm's role
as consultant and as testifying expert in the underlying action, failed to
direct and supervise the CPA's work in that action, and improperly repre-
sented to the court the nature of the work undertaken and the testimony
to be provided by the accounting firm.
In addition, the SWAS doctrine does not consider the comparative
fault of the client. For example, in the United States District Court case
underlying the Mattco Forge cases, the court found that Mattco and its
owner were guilty of GE's allegations of fraud, including fabrication and
knowing production of the newly-created worksheets.97
If a court only applies the SWAS doctrine, the expert may be held
unjustly responsible for the entire loss. The expert's liability will be joint
and several, although the expert's fault may be insignificant in compari-
son to the fault of others. Although an expert may have a claim for con-
tribution or comparative indemnity against others, the expert will still
have some liability, or have disproportionate liability if the others have
settled for disproportionately small amounts. For example, the trial court
in Mattco Forge approved a settlement agreement between Mattco and
its former attorneys, who Mattco had not sued.' The agreement provid-
ed that if Mattco recovered more than $750,000, settled the case, or stip-
ulated a judgment with Arthur Young, the attorneys would owe noth-
ing.' However, the California Court of Appeal rejected the settlement
because there was "no substantial evidence to support a critical assump-
tion" concerning Arthur Young's liability."° One can easily imagine, due
to the factual and legal uncertainties of the malpractice case, that Mattco
and its original attorneys could have reached and substantiated a settle-
96. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 584-86
(Cal. Ct App. 1995).
97. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784-86.
98. See Mattco Forge, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 588.
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ment which would have been reasonable at the time of the settlement,
but which would have amounted to much less than a proportionate part
of the actual jury verdict.
B. Proof of Significance Will be Too Speculative
Even if the substantial factor test is somehow incorporated into a
litigation services malpractice suit, jurors will still be left "in a sea of
speculation and conjecture."101 Application of the substantial factor test
would further complicate an already complex trial by requiring more evi-
dence about the significance of various factors in the outcome of the
underlying suit; such evidence can only be speculative because of the
complex nature of the litigation. The Mattco Forge H opinion did not
disclose the method to be used by the plaintiff to prove that Arthur
Young's negligence was a substantial factor in the outcome of the under-
lying United States District Court case.
One alternative is to allow the parties to present the jury with factual
evidence regarding insignificance and allow the jury to form its own
opinion."° Can juries be expected to analyze competently whether the
expert's negligence was a substantial factor in the outcome of the under-
lying suit? Without expert witness testimony, jury determination of
whether expert malpractice was a substantial factor would be a fiasco,
because a lay juror does not have a working knowledge of the rules and
procedures of litigation and the rules of law that could affect the out-
come of the underlying suit. To leave such a complex analysis to a jury
without professional guidance from expert witnesses would turn the trial
into a crapshoot.
The only other alternative is for legal experts familiar with the litiga-
tion process to provide opinion testimony that would be considered by
the jury. Legal experts would assess the proportionate contribution of
the defendant-expert's negligence to the outcome of the underlying suit
by analyzing the various factors that affect the outcome of a lawsuit. In
non-litigation attorney malpractice cases, expert witness testimony is
usually essential."° In litigation attorney malpractice cases, however,
courts have refused, or have been reluctant, to admit expert testimony
101. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
102. See Skinner v. Stone, Raskin & Israel, 724 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1983) (sug-
gesting that "(a] jury, with all the facts before it" might be able to determine whether
an attorney's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm).
103. See 4 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 19, § 32.16, at 205-07.
pertaining to the outcome of the underlying suit because the courts have
deemed such testimony too speculative."° Courts often cite a so-called
"battle of the experts" and the high probability of confusing the jury as
problems inherent with using experts to opine about the outcome of liti-
gation."°5 There is no reason to believe that testimony on the signifi-
cance of causation in a litigation services malpractice suit would be any
less speculative.
C. The SWAS Doctrine is Inappropriate for Proving Damages
Courts should not use the SWAS doctrine to prove damages in litiga-
tion services malpractice cases because the differences between experts
and attorneys amplifies the level of speculation and conjecture that may
be tolerable in an attorney litigation malpractice suit. Because the parties
cannot duplicate the original situation, a SWAS intrinsically has a degree
of speculation and conjecture. That degree of speculation and conjecture
is further increased when an expert must litigate the underlying case in a
SWAS due to the fact that an expert is at a greater disadvantage than the
attorney originally in charge of the underlying suit.
The analysis of this issue in the Mattco Forge H opinion is flawed. In
that case, the California Court of Appeal held that the client in the under-
lying lawsuit must establish through a SWAS that the client would have
prevailed had the accounting firm properly handled its duties in the un-
derlying suit."° In discussing the SWAS doctrine, the court of appeal
appeared to be more concerned with the SWAS as a measure of damages
than as a means of finding causation. 7 The court stated that the SWAS
burden persists "probably because it is the most effective safeguard yet
devised against speculative and conjectural claims in this era of ever ex-
104. See id. § 32.17, at 222-23; cf leberman v. Employers Ins., 419 A.2d 417, 427
(N.J. 1980) (stating that the method of proving damages "should be within the discre-
tion of the trial judge").
105. See 4 MAUEN & SMrrH, supra note 19, § 32.17, at 222-23 ("The fact that liti-
gation virtually is an American pastime emphatically shows that few attorneys ever
agree on the likely outcome of a lawsuit or on the amount of probable recovery.").
106. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783-99.
107. See id. In declaring the SWAS standard for attorney malpractice alive and well
in California, the court of appeal noted that Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32
(Cal. Ct. App. 1960), a significant case in attorney malpractice jurisprudence, provided
"the rationale in support of an admittedly burdensome and complicated [SWASI ap-
proach: it avoids 'speculative values as a measure of recovery.'" See Mattco Forge II,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787 (quoting Campbell, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33). The court also
referred to subsequent attorney malpractice and insurance malpractice cases that
adopted the SWAS approach. See id. at 787-88. In the insurer bad faith cases, the
SWAS doctrine was not used to prove causation, but merely to prove damages. See
id.
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panding litigation. It is a standard of proof designed to limit damages to
those actually caused by a professional's malfeasance.""° Thus, the
court of appeal adopted the SWAS doctrine by process of elimination
and was reluctant to consider a new approach for litigation services. 9
The majority stated that "[c]ertainly, to date, no other approach has been
accepted by the courts."" °
Mattco Forge H failed to address either the ways in which an expert's
participation in a lawsuit differs from the participation of an attorney or
the limited impact an expert has on the outcome of the underlying law-
suit."' The court of appeal incorrectly found that the different relation-
ships between a client and its attorney and a client and its experts per-
forming litigation services did not make a difference for purposes of
applying the SWAS doctrine. The majority stated, "[Wie would not be the
first court to hold the same evidentiary approach is applicable in analo-
gous situations where the claim is that professional negligence caused
the loss of a lawsuit.""' In support of its conclusion, the majority cited
the Supreme Court of Missouri for the following proposition: "Often
[professionals] play as great a role in the organization and shaping and
evaluation of their client's case, as do the lawyers. Those who provide
these services are selected for their skill and ability and are compensated
accordingly just as any other professional.""'
Other cases cited in the Mattco Forge H opinion as support for treating
experts as attorneys were not appropriate. As an illustration of another
professional treated like an attorney in order to determine damages, the
court cited an insurer negligence case in which the insurer completely
controlled the underlying suit and improperly conducted the defense."4
108. Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
109. See id.
110. See id. Conceding that the arguments of some critics of SWAS are meritorious,
the court cited law review articles for the general proposition that the SWAS doctrine
placed an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff and, therefore, allowed attorneys who
had not met professional standards to evade liability. See id. at 788-89.
111. See id. at 783-99.
112. Id. at 789.
113. See id. (citing Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 682 (Mo. 1992) (in-
volving witness immunity as opposed to application of the SWAS doctrine).
114. See id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Cal. CL App.
1986), overruted on other grounds by Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1997)) (discussing plaintiff's allegation that insurer improperly conducted defense of
lawsuit). The court also cited .Wi//iams v. WraxaU, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (Cal. Ct
App. 1995), an expert serologist negligence suit in which the court declined to apply
the SWAS doctrine. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
The other cases cited from non-California jurisdictions either (1) did not
involve a SWAS, (2) ultimately resulted in the plaintiff relitigating the suit
against the original opponent instead of the negligent professional, or (3)
ultimately resulted in the plaintiff litigating against a party who was not a
litigation professional and had previously admitted that it was the correct
opponent.115
115. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788-89. The citation of the four cases
from other jurisdictions as support for the court's conclusion is extremely dubious.
According to one case, a plaintiff must prove damages as a result of expert malprac-
tice by first proving that plaintiff would have prevailed in the underlying lawsuit See
id. at 789-90 (citing Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)).
However, based on the quoted charge to the jury in the malpractice case, there was
no SWAS at trial. See Schqffer, 585 N.E.2d at 858. The Schoffer court did not men-
tion a SWAS, and did not state that a SWAS was required or that a SWAS had been
conducted. See id. at 856-59. Schaffer is better characterized as an example of a vin-
dictive client who decided to sue a friendly expert because the expert, hired to testi-
fy in the underlying suit, changed his opinion so he could testify truthfully. See id. at
856-57. Schaffer may also be characterized as an example of a case in which the ac-
tions of the attorneys allegedly contributed to the unfavorable outcome. See id. at
858. The Mattco II majority cited another case for essentially the same proposition;
however, in that case, the plaintiff sued a hospital for losing evidence which was
allegedly necessary to prevail in the underlying lawsuit. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 788-89 (citing Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 556 N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ill. App. Ct
1990)). No professional malpractice (attorney, expert, or otherwise) was involved that
case. See Rodgers, 556 N.E. 2d at 914-19. The Rodgers court required the plaintiff to
prove that the loss of evidence caused its defeat in the underlying suit, in order to
prevail in the negligence claim against the hospital. See id. at 915-16. The Rodgers
court did not mention a SWAS and did not state that a SWAS was required. See id.
at 914-19. The Mattco Forge If opinion also cited a case in which a plaintiff sued a
manufacturer for misrepresentation because the manufacturer admitted that it had
manufactured the product during discovery in the underlying suit, but, after the stat-
ute of limitations had run, it was discovered that the defendant manufacturer was not
the true manufacturer. See Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788-89 (citing Beeck
v. Kapalis, 302 N.W.2d 90, 92-93 (Iowa 1981)). The Supreme Court of Iowa stated that
the case was analogous to attorney malpractice in that the plaintiff would have to
prove that it could have prevailed against the true manufacturer. See Beeck, 302
N.W.2d at 93-94. Obviously, no professional malpractice (attorney, expert, or other-
wise) was involved in Beeck. See id. at 90-98. Apparently, it would be easier for a
manufacturer to defend a suit involving a product it originally thought it had made
than it would be for an expert to defend a reconstruction of a suit in which it had
nothing in common with the defendant therein. Next, the Mattco Forge I court cited
a case that involved a negligence lawsuit against the county for an error committed
by the county clerk, allegedly causing the denial of an appeal of the underlying case.
Mattco Forge II, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789 (citing Universal Ideas Corp. v. Linn County,
669 P.2d 1165, 1165-66 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)). The Oregon court held that if the trial
court determined on remand that the appeal would have been successful, then, before
holding the county liable, the trial court must retry the original lawsuit to determine
whether the appellant would have prevailed therein. See Universal Ideas Corp., 669
P.2d at 1166. The court of appeal held in the subsequent retrial that the appellant
could relitigate the underlying suit against the original opponent. See id. Generally, a
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A SWAS is inherently suspect because it is impossible to accurately
reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the underlying suit."' The
SWAS approach "wholly ignores the possibility of settlement."1
7
Furthermore, the passage of time may affect the quality of evidence for
both parties."' In addition, memories of witnesses may fade or evi-
dence may be lost or destroyed."9 There may be a jury trial for the
SWAS, whereas the client may not have been entitled to one for the
underlying suit.2 ' Perhaps the client may prevail in the SWAS merely as
a result of more effective advocacy or better preparedness through hind-
sight, rather than elimination of professional malpractice. 2'
It is unfair to impose the SWAS doctrine on an expert. The expert is
forced to try a suit that possibly no one ever intended to try. The expert
is forced to pursue a cause which the expert previously opposed. The
process of litigating a SWAS is obviously much more difficult for an
expert's attorney than for an attorney representing another attorney ac-
cused of litigation malpractice. Because the expert did not control the
litigation of the underlying suit, the expert does not have the benefit of
hindsight and experience to prevail in a SWAS. An expert, unlike an
attorney or an insurer, does not have ultimate control of the litigation.
The expert merely reports to the attorney and possibly testifies at trial.
An expert performs tasks only under the supervision of the attorney. The
attorney is the advocate, whereas the expert is employed by the attorney
to objectively deliver information or an opinion.
Unlike an attorney-defendant's counsel, an expert's counsel does not
have the experience of preparing for, and possibly trying, the underlying
case. Unlike an expert, an attorney-defendant ordinarily will have con-
SWAS is not opposed by the original opponent.
116. See Gautam v. DeLuca, 521 A.2d 1343, 1348 (discussing weaknesses of the
SWAS approach); Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a
7Wal-A Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ.
L REV. 40, 47 (1989) (reviewing weaknesses of the SWAS doctrine).
117. Gautam, 521 A.2d at 1348.
118. See id.
119. See LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 48, § 301:104.
120. See, e.g., Ceriale v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(rejecting defendant's contention that equitable and legal issues should be severed
and allowing the plaintiff to try the legal malpractice suit to a jury even though she
may not have been entitled to a jury in the underlying suit).
121. See Paul D. Rheingold, Legal Malpractice: Plaintifs Strategies, LITIGATION,
Winter 1989, at 16 ("Often the first attorney neglected the case (inexcusably of
course) because it wasn't much of a case.").
suited extensively with the former client, will have determined not only
the strengths of the client's claim, but also its weaknesses, and may be in
a better position to defend the client's claim than the original
opponent."2 More importantly, an attorney who is sued for malpractice
has access to privileged information and work product, which can be
used or disclosed."2 An expert cannot use or disclose such informa-
tion.'2
An attorney's performance is a significant factor in the outcome of the
underlying suit even if the attorney does not commit malpractice. The
attorney sets the strategy, chooses the witnesses and the experts, writes
the briefs and motions, conducts and defends discovery, objects to or
defends the introduction of evidence, decides whether to settle, decides
whether to appeal, and makes many other decisions and performs many
other tasks that affect the outcome of a case. For example, the attorney
may decide to apply less effort in what the attorney perceives to be a
losing case.
Furthermore, an expert's role is not analogous to that of an insurer. An
insurer has ultimate control of a lawsuit because the insurer decides
whether to try or settle the lawsuit, and chooses or approves the attor-
ney. An expert does not perform such tasks.
The Mattco Forge II majority also stated, as a justification for applying
the SWAS doctrine, that professionals who provide litigation support
services are subject to liability if they perform negligently in their other
areas of practice and concluded that "in situations where alleged negli-
gent conduct is analogous to an attorney's mishandling litigation, a plain-
tiff should be held to the same burden."2 '
Expert liability for negligence in performing litigation services, howev-
er, is not analogous to expert liability for negligence in performing other
services. Not all experts are subject to professional standards for litiga-
tion services.'26 The rationale for the absence of professional standards
122. See David 0. Haughey, Lauyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48
NOTRE DAME LAw. 888, 893 (1973).
123. See 4 MALLEN & SmITH, supra note 19, § 32.29, at 257-60, § 32.31, at 272-74
(noting that the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege is available in
an action by a client against his attorney). In fact, the work product may not be
available to the client. See id. § 32.31, at 272-73; cf. CAL CIv. PROc. CODE § 2018(i)
(West Supp. 1977) (establishing no work-product privilege in action between attorney
and client concerning breach of duty by attorney).
124. See 4 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 19, § 32.28, at 250-54, § 32.31, at 272-74
(explaining that an attorney is usually required to assert attorney-client privilege for
the following communications: attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal re-
search, and theories absolutely protected from client's adversaries).
125. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 789 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (Mattco Forge II).
126. For example, because the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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is that an expert customizes each engagement according to the needs of
the client and the attorney, and that the expert's work product is subject
to scrutiny by the client, the attorney, and the other party (through dis-
covery and cross-examination). 27 In effect, the client and the attorney
determine the objectives and the standards for the expert's work.
The method mandated by the court of appeal in the Mattco Forge II
decision for proving causation and damages does not sufficiently elimi-
nate speculation and conjecture. When this deficiency is considered in
light of the court opinions discussing witness immunity, the case for
witness immunity for party experts becomes compelling.
V. REVISITING WITNESS IMMUNITY
A. History
As the Mattco Forge cases illustrate, if witness immunity is not avail-
able for an expert, the result can be extremely harsh. The few courts
that have considered whether witness immunity applies to party experts
have not reached a consensus. As discussed above, the California Court
of Appeal, in Mattco Forge I, refused to extend the California statutory
litigation immunity for witnesses to a friendly CPA expert for liability to
a client arising from litigation services performed during discovery."
Several months later, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Murphy, held
that common law witness immunity did not bar an action by a client
against a friendly engineering expert for negligence in pretrial litigation
services. "
Other than the Mattco Forge I and Murphy decisions, only courts in
Washington'" and Pennsylvania 3 ' have considered the issue of immu-
(AICPA) classifies litigation services as consulting services, litigation services are
generally not subject to the stringent reporting standards that apply to audits and
attestation services, but are subject to the comparatively general and meager stan-
dards for consulting services. See Application of AICPA Standards in the Perfor-
mance of Litigation Services, CONSULTING SERVS. SPECIAL REP. 93-1, § 71/120
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1993) [hereinafter SPECIAL REP.]; Attes-
tation Standards: Attestation Engagements Interpretation of Section 100, 1 AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, § 9100.47-.55 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts. 1990)
[hereinafter PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS].
127. See SPECIAL REP., supra note 126, § 711110.
128. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 790 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (Mattco Forge I).
129. See Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1992).
130. See Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989)
nity for party experts. The 1989 Washington case of Bruce v. Byrne-
Stevens & Associates Engineers, Inc., was the first litigation services
immunity case decided." The holding in Bruce was rejected in the
Mattco Forge I and Murphy cases but was followed by a Pennsylvania
court in Panitz v. Behrend." In Bruce, the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton provided a comprehensive analysis of the issues that to-date have
been considered in determining the scope of witness immunity."M In
Panitz, a Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the California court's
holding in Mattco Forge I and concluded that the Supreme Court. of
Washington, in Bruce, had the better view, that is, that absolute immuni-
ty exists for friendly experts and covers in-court testimony, including
acts and communications in connection with preparing such
testimony.'35
As noted above, although recent commentators have overwhelmingly
argued that an expert should be liable when the expert receives compen-
sation and fails to act as a reasonably prudent professional in rendering
litigation services, none of these commentators has seriously considered
the problems of proving causation and damages discussed herein."
Early English and American courts granted absolute immunity to wit-
nesses in order to shield them from subsequent defamation suits based
upon their testimony. Modem courts however, have struggled to decide
whether to expand or contract the traditional scope of witness immuni-
ty.37 Some American courts limit witness immunity to statements made
in response to questions asked by counsel or the court and exclude from
immunity irrelevant statements volunteered by a witness." In particu-
lar, Missouri courts limit the scope of immunity to adverse witnesses and
(finding that witness immunity extends to actions forming the basis of compensated
friendly engineer's testimony).
131. See Panitz v. Behrend, 632 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a
friendly expert medical witness was immune from civil liability for her testimony).
132. See Bruce, 776 P.2d at 666.
133. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
134. For detailed reviews of the Bruce decision, see Pahl, supra note 12 (comment-
ing on the application of the rules of witness immunity to expert witnesses) and
Jensen, supra note 14 (favoring the denial of witness immunity to experts receiving
compensation from individual litigants).
135. See Panitz, 632 A.2d at 565-66. A federal district court in Pennsylvania, how-
ever, recently interpreted Pennsylvania law to provide immunity for adverse expert
witnesses and, in a footnote, expressed doubt that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would reject Mattco Forge I and Murphy and affirm its own lower court's ruling in
Panitz, which extended immunity to friendly witnesses. See Serchia v. MacMillan, No.
CIV. k96-2910, 1997 WL 127984, at *1 & n.7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1997).
136. See supra text accompanying note 14.
137. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1983); Murphy v. A.A. Mathews,
841 S.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Mo. 1992).
138. See Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 675-76.
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to statements made directly in the judicial proceeding or in an affidavit
or ,pleading.ln On the other hand, many jurisdictions now hold that a
common law absolute quasi-judicial immunity protects court-appointed
experts, but most of those jurisdictions have not yet addressed issues
involving compensated friendly experts.1"
The rationale for witness immunity is avoidance of two forms of wit-
ness self-censorship.' First, a witness may be reluctant to testify if the
witness is apprehensive of subsequent liability."' Secondly, a witness
may be inclined to shade the witness's testimony in favor of the potential
plaintiff to magnify uncertainties, and thus deprive the finder of fact of
candid, objective, and undistorted evidence if the witness knows that the
witness might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to
pay damages."4
B. Compensation and Friendliness do not Make a Difference
The primary, if not exclusive, difference between an expert witness
and a lay witness is that an expert witness can give opinions about sub-
139. See id. at 676-77 (citing Missouri precedent in support of the denial of immu-
nity where an expert was not sued for defamation, the expert was not an adverse
witness, and the claim was limited to litigation support services, not testimony).
140. Court-appointed medical experts are the primary beneficiaries of absolute, qua-
si-judicial immunity. See Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1087 & n.1 (Alaska 1994)
(holding that a court-appointed psychologist was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im-
munity and citing numerous parallel holdings from other jurisdictions); Gallion v.
Woytassek, 504 N.W.2d 76, 83-84 (Neb. 1993) (holding that a court-appointed psychia-
trist was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for act done within scope of
authority "without willfulness, malice, or corruption"). In Pennsylvania, absolute immu-
nity from medical malpractice liability was granted to court-appointed, medical expert
witnesses, but not necessarily on a quasi-judicial basis. See Clodgo by Clodgo v. Bow-
man, 601 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). But see James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914,
916-18 ('rex. 1982) (recognizing common law absolute immunity for defamation, but
interpreting a statute to limit liability for psychiatrists, who render diagnoses as part
of an involuntary hospitalization proceeding, from "negligent misdiagnosis-medical
malpractice merely because their diagnoses were later communicated to a court in
due course of judicial proceedings"). In New Jersey, court-appointed accountants are
not entitled to the same immunities enjoyed by medical professionals in many states.
See Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397, 398-403 (N.J. 1984) (holding that an accoun-
tant jointly selected by the parties and appointed by the court as an "impartial wit-
ness" was not immune from a negligence claim brought by one of the parties).
141. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333.
142. See id.
143. Id.
jects lay witnesses cannot and that experts need not rely on first-hand
knowledge to formulate such opinions.'" Whether they are compensat-
ed or uncompensated, friendly or adverse, experts are under the same
sworn obligation as other witnesses: "To tell the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, so help you God."'
Attorneys are distinguishable from experts in that they are advocates.
As such, attorneys, unlike expert witnesses, do not have to tell "the
whole truth."'46 They present only evidence that advances a desired out-
come. The objective of an advocate is not to determine truth, but rather
to communicate a position statement about the evidence presented to
the trier of fact.'47
As a matter of law, experts are distinguishable from attorneys in that
they serve the court by offering impartial testimony and serve their cli-
ents by giving impartial advice.' Following the Bruce court's granting
of immunity to friendly experts, the majority in Panitz stated that "[tihe
primary purpose of expert testimony is not to assist one party or another
in winning the case but to assist the trier of the facts in understanding
complicated matters."'49 In Murphy, the Supreme Court of Missouri er-
roneously stated that experts "function as paid advisors and as paid ad-
vocates" rather than as "unbiased court servant[s]," and concluded that
the "policy of ensuring frank and objective testimony" was not advanced
by extending immunity to them."M
Some experts are subject to standards that preclude them from func-
tioning as advocates. A CPA expert who provides litigation services can-
not be an advocate because of the requirement that a CPA be impartial
in rendering such services. Accountants are subject to a standard that re-
144. See HAROLD A. LIEBENSON, You, THE EXPERT WITNEss 42-44 (1962); FRANK J.
MACHOVEC, THE EXPERT WITNESS SURVIVAL MANUAL 6 (1987). Generally, opinion testi-
mony by a lay witness is limited to certain matters. Compare FED. R Evin. 701 (lay
witness testimony primarily limited to first-hand knowledge or observation), with FED.
R. EvID. 702 & 703 (expert witness testimony is related to specialized knowledge and
opinions are not dependant upon first-hand knowledge).
145. See MACHOVEC, supra note 144, at 6 (emphasis added).
146. See supra text accompanying note 145.
147. See BARTON L INGRAHAM, The Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on the
Role of the Criminologist as Expert Witness, in EXPERT WITNESSES: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN
THE COURTROOM 178-79 (Patrick R. Anderson & L Thomas Winfree, Jr. eds., State
Univ. of N.Y. Press 1987).
148. See Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 164 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In theory,
despite the fact that one party retained and paid for the services of an expert wit-
ness, expert witnesses are supposed to testify impartially in the sphere of their ex-
pertise."); Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 669 (Wash.
1989) (finding that the expert "serves the court" as a matter of law).
149. See Panitz v. Behrend, 632 A.2d 562, 565 (Pa. Super. Ct App. Div. 1993).
150. See Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Mo. 1992).
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quires them to exercise "integrity and objectivity." 5' The integrity stan-
dard requires a CPA to be honest and candid within the constraints of
client confidentiality, and the objectivity standard requires a CPA to be
impartial, intellectually honest, and free from conflicts of interest."s
Witness immunity preserves the integrity of the judicial process by
encouraging objectivity in expert testimony."s It removes the apprehen-
sion of subsequent liability that might induce self-censorship, thereby
depriving the trier of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evi-
dence."5 If some courts think party experts are actually paid advocates,
how can they believe that such experts will not shade the truth or worse
to avoid being sued by their client? The Mattco Forge I majority stated
that granting immunity to friendly experts has the effect of encouraging
untruthfulness."S The Murphy court agreed." However, an expert's
fear of being sued by its client, if the client deems the outcome to be
unfavorable, may have the same effect. Lack of immunity may cause
experts to "assert the most extreme position favorable to the party for
whom they testify" in order to avoid the "threat of civil liability based on
an inadequate final result in litigation."57
A potential party expert may be reluctant to testify or provide litiga-
tion services if the client is allowed to subsequently sue the expert and
impose thereupon the entire responsibility for an unfavorable outcome.
In today's world of cutthroat, no-holds-barred litigation, there is no rea-
son for an expert not to believe that a vindictive client, just like a vindic-
tive opponent, will sue merely if the client does not like the outcome.
Immunity allows friendly experts to testify truthfully and perform litiga-
tion services with integrity and objectivity, and without fear of retribu-
tion from an unhappy client.
151. See Statement on Standards for Consulting Services, 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, § 100.07, at 15,013 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts. 1991). Con-
suiting services have been defined to include litigation services. See id. § 100.05(d),
at 15,012.
152. See id. § 100.07 n.2, at 15,013 (citing Code of Professional Conduct, 2 AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Art. III & IV, §§ 54.04 & 55.04, at 4311-12 (American Inst.
of Certified Pub. Accts. 1992)).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 788 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
156. See Murphy V. A.A. Matthews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Mo. 1992).
157. See Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 670 (Wash.
1989).
For example, in Schaffer v. Donegan, a vindictive client sued a medical
doctor who had been hired by the client's attorney to testify as an ex-
pert."s In that case, the client sued the doctor for malpractice because
the doctor, after being deposed in preparation for the underlying suit,
changed his opinion before testifying at trial, but after the trial had al-
ready started."s The court of appeals refused to overturn the jury ver-
dict in favor of the doctor, stating as follows:
A witness has a duty to appear and testify truthfully concerning his knowledge or
belief .... Fundamentally, no witness can be required to testify, and no witness
should be expected to testify, to anything other than the truth as [the witness]
sees it and according to what [the witness] believes it to be. The same is expected
of expert witnesses."W
The wide scale unavailability of quality litigation services will likely
upset the balance of justice. In Murphy, the majority stated that "[t]here
is no reason to believe that professionals will abandon the area of litiga-
tion support." Furthermore, the court noted that professionals have con-
tinued to provide other services despite potential liability.' Both of the
court's propositions are unfounded.
In fact, an increasing number of large accounting firms are dropping
audit clients due to the risk of costly litigation. During the first four
months of 1997, the largest accounting firms "dropped [thirty] publicly
traded companies as audit clients."" By comparison, in 1996, large ac-
counting firms dropped ninety-two clients, up from eighty-five in
1994. " A vast majority of the rejected clients are small, lesser-known
companies. "
The threat of liability may drive all but full-time experts out of litiga-
tion services, primarily due to the fact that only full-time professional
witnesses are able to carry liability insurance."' For example, the uni-
versity professor or other knowledgeable person who occasionally testi-
fies on a highly technical or esoteric issue will probably not opt to pur-
chase expensive malpractice insurance for protection; as a result, such
witnesses may refuse to testify.'67 This potential loss of witnesses
158. See Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 856-57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
159. See id. at 856-57.
160. Id. at 860.
161. See Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 681; Bruce, 776 P.2d at 675 (Pearson, J., dissenting)
("[Elven if malpractice liability intimidates some experts, others will rise to fill the
need.").
162. See Elizabeth MacDonald, More Accounting Firms Are Dumping Risky Clients,
WAU ST. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at A2.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Bruce, 776 P.2d at 670.
167. See id.
[Vol. 25: 1, 1997] Suit Within a Suit
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
would be unfortunate because such occasional experts generally can be
relied upon to approach their duty to the court "with great objectivity
and professionalism."" If courts do not extend immunity to party ex-
perts, what type of professional will risk the exposure to liability?
As the court noted in Bruce, all extensions of immunity are protected
by the "safeguards against false or inaccurate testimony" already inherent
in the judicial process." For example, the witness oath, cross-examina-
tion, and the threat of prosecution for perjury are in place to ensure
witness reliability.7 ° The Bruce court dismissed arguments that experts
will offer more reliable testimony when subject to a recognized threat of
prosecution, reasoning that "[clivil liability is too blunt an instrument to
achieve much of a gain in reliability in the arcane and complex calcula-
tions and judgments which expert witnesses are called upon to
make.n
171
C. Specific Professional Standards are not Feasible
Because specific standards for litigation services are nonexistent due
to their infeasibility, immunity is warranted. The Murphy court stated
that imposing liability on friendly experts would encourage them to be
careful and accurate, just as it does in their respective areas of prac-
tice." However, litigation services are not analogous to other areas of
practice. This is due to the fact that experts, when rendering litigation
services, rely on their clients to specify tasks and expectations. As a
result, the nature of litigation services requires that experts perform ad
hoc procedures in response to the particular needs of the attorney and
the client, thereby rendering infeasible the development of detailed stan-
dards.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 667.
170. See id.; see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1983). In Bruce, how-
ever, Justice Pearson stated in his dissent that "the threat of perjury and the rigors
of cross examination only protect against intentional misstatements and those neg-
ligent statements the opponent wishes to expose." Bruce, 776 P.2d at 675 (Pearson,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
171. See Bruce, 776 P.2d at 670.
172. See Murphy v. AA. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Mo. 1992); Levine v. Wiss &
Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984) (holding that immunity for professionals acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity was not extended to a court-appointed accountant hired to
appraise a business); cf James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982) (finding that
the Texas Mental Health Code provided only immunity for actions by professionals
who performed without negligence).
Since at least 1905, members of the accounting profession have been
recognized as comprising a class of skilled professionals subject to the
same rules of liability for malpractice as members of other professions,
such as architects and engineers. 3 Until recently, accounting malprac-
tice centered primarily in the area of audit and tax services.'74 The stan-
dards of practice for audit and tax services are well-developed and have
been promulgated in detail by authoritative bodies.' In contrast, the
professional standards for litigation services are not nearly as specific as
those that govern audits. 6 Litigation services generally are not subject
to the stringent reporting standards applicable to audits.' The Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) classifies litigation
services as consulting services because such services differ significantly
from audits. 8 Since the Mattco Forge jury verdict, the AICPA has is-
sued only one very general authoritative pronouncement concerning
consulting services and several nonauthoritative publications discussing
the general standards of consulting services as applied to litigation ser-
vices.'79 Before the Mattco Forge jury verdict there were no such publi-
cations. Experts in other professions may not be subject to any estab-
lished or authoritative standards.
D. Pretrial Services Deserve Immunity
Pretrial litigation services should be immunized notwithstanding the
fact that they do not involve courtroom testimony. The self-censorship
rationale for common law witness immunity is equally applicable to pre-
trial services of experts for two reasons. First, a party may not be able to
obtain expert services in preparation for trials involving technical or
esoteric issues because experts may be reluctant to offer their services
due to apprehension of subsequent liability. Second, an expert may dis-
tort pretrial advice in favor of the client due to a fear of subsequent lia-
bility.
173. See Carl S. Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants,
12 VAND. L REv. 797, 797 (1959) (citing Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 96 N.Y.S. 820
(N.Y. App. Div. 1905)).
174. See Susanne Sclafane, New Risks May Impact Accountant Liability Market,
NATIONAL UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Nov. 11, 1996, at
11, available in 1996 WL 8651114.
175. See Henry H. Janssen, The Expectation Gap When Accountants Testify as Ex-
pert Witnesses, 40 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 441 (1996).
176. See id.
177. See SPECIAL REP., supra note 126, § 71/120; PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra
note 126, §§ 9100.47-.55.
178. See SPECIAL REP., supra note 126, §§ 71/100-1, 71/100-2.
179. See CONSULTING SERVS. PRACTICE AID 96-3, §§ 74/115.03, .04 (listing relevant
authoritative and nonauthoritative AICPA publications).
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The proper course would be to ignore the belief expressed in Mattco
Forge I that immunity for experts does not encourage future truthful
testimony if the underlying suit does not reach the trial stage."s Ironi-
cally, the Mattco Forge I court noted that the statutory privilege other-
wise applies even if the services are performed outside the courtroom
and involve no function of the court.'8' If the California statutory privi-
lege applies to other services outside the courtroom, it should also pro-
tect friendly experts who are merely trial consultants. Further support
for such protection is the fact that witnesses in pretrial proceedings,
such as grand juries (where there is no cross examination), are granted
immunity although they may not later testify and be subject to scrutiny
at trial.'
E. Immunity is Needed Against Negligence as Well as Defamation
The dissent in Bruce observed that an attorney remains liable to the
client for malpractice in a judicial proceeding, but enjoys absolute immu-
nity from liability for defamation in the same proceeding."s Based on
the foregoing, the dissent argued that common law witness immunity
should extend only to defamation."s
However, the dissent neglected to note that fear of subsequent litiga-
tion threatens an expert witness regardless of whether the cause of ac-
tion is based upon defamation or some other theory of recovery." A
client should not be able to circumvent an expert's immunity by pursuing
a claim in terms other than defamation."s The Bruce majority noted
that there are a large number of cases in a wide range of jurisdictions
180. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780, 787 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (Mattco Forge I).
181. See id. (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 369, 370-72 (Cal. 1990)).
182. See Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs., Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 667-68 (Wash.
1989) (citation omitted).
183. See id. at 674 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
184. See id. at 675 (Pearson, J., dissenting) ("[A] distinction must be drawn between
defamation and acts of professional malpractice subsequently published in the court-
room."); see also Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Mo. 1992) ("Every
[Missouri] decision was limited to subsequent actions in defamation or defamation-
type lawsuits.").
185. See Bruce, 776 P.2d at 670.
186. See id. The court stated, "(W]e must not permit its circumvention by affording
an almost equally unrestricted action under a different label." Id. (citing Rainier's
Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 117 A.2d 889, 895 (N.J. 1955)).
granting witness immunity to bar causes of action other than defama-
tion.
187
Perhaps the Bruce dissent makes the unintended point that the scope
of immunity for attorneys should be broadened. In England, from which
the United States historically draws its common law immunity jurispru-
dence, advocates have enjoyed absolute immunity from negligence liabili-
ty for more than two-hundred years.""
F. Lack of a Sufficient Method of Proving Causation and Damages
Justifies Immunity
Until courts develop a sufficient method of proving causation and
damages in litigation services malpractice cases, courts should extend
immunity to party experts who perform litigation services. The appropri-
ate standard of proof in any negligence case should require providing the
trier of fact with sufficient evidence on which to base an award without
speculation and conjecture as to causation and damages. As shown
above, although a SWAS may be a safeguard against speculative damages
in an attorney litigation malpractice suit or insurer negligence suit, it
does not adequately protect against speculation as to causation and dam-
ages in a litigation services malpractice suit. In addition, the significance
of an expert's negligence, whether determined solely by a jury or with
the assistance of expert witness testimony, also will be based on specula-
tion and conjecture. Under such circumstances, an expert should not be
exposed to liability for the entire harm to a client who has experienced
an unfavorable outcome in the underlying lawsuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
An expert who performs litigation services is more analogous to a lay
witness than an attorney. Therefore, a party expert should be entitled to
absolute common law witness immunity for both pretrial services and
testimony regardless of whether the expert is compensated or friendly.
Negative attitudes toward expert witnesses date as far back as the
dawn of this century.'" However, experts should not become scape-
187. See id. at 671 (citing Brody v. Montalbano, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (barring claims of malicious prosecution, conspiracy to interfere with contract,
and conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress)). But see James v. Brown,
637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982) (concluding that although defamation action was barred
by common law immunity, negligence action was available pursuant to state statute).
188. See Melissa Newman, Note, The Case Against Advocates' Immunity: A Com-
parative Study, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 267, 268-69 (1995). "Until at least the fif-
teenth century, [English] advocates were subject to the same liability for professional
malpractice as other professional[s]." Id. at 269.
189. See Jensen, supra note 14, at 185, 192-93 (citing Albers v. Church of the
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goats for our country's current overzealous litigiousness. The threat of
expert liability seems more likely to result in expert opinions being moti-
vated by the client's interests rather than by applicable professional stan-
dards.1" Expert witnesses assist both attorneys and triers of fact in un-
derstanding complex issues and provide a basis for decisions that would
otherwise be based on ignorance, speculation, or conjecture. Subjecting
negligent experts to huge judgments based on speculation and conjecture
would be painful irony. Meanwhile, courts and clients should depend
upon perjury laws, the adversarial process, and the diligence of supervis-
ing counsel to ferret out substandard evidence from experts. A rule that
makes an expert liable for acts and communications that occur prior to
or during judicial proceedings "would be unrealistically narrow, would
not reflect the realities of litigation and would undermine the gains in
forthrightness on which the rule of witness immunity rests." '
Nazarene, 698 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1983)).
190. See Bruce, 776 P.2d at 670.
191. See id. at 673.

